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Stability and Change in Constitutional Law
Robert B. McKay*
The forms and functions of constitutional government are in constant and restless motion, principally restrained from heedless change
by the innate conservatism of the law, which finds in stability its most
worthy objective. The law regards change merely for the sake of
change with suspicion, demanding in the name of stare decisis special
justification for departure from the past. But the law also has its
moments of movement, particularly in the ever-shifting domain of
constitutional law, of which it could be said, with Dean Pound: "Law
must be stable, and yet it cannot stand still."'
The problem is scarcely new. No society can long survive in which
appropriate accommodation is not somehow made to assure stability
without stultifying progress. From the conflicting demands of stability
and change the law must find, in the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo,
"'some path of compromise" which offers promise of growth. "Rest and
motion, unrelieved and unchecked, are equally destructive .... " 2 In
this search for proper balance constitutional law presents special
difficulties. Stability is essential to preserve certainty and to assure that
government and citizen alike may rely upon standards of constant
value, while against this compelling necessity there is balanced the
equally vital demand for change in the name of progress. The tensions
between the two are real and dangerous unless clearly confronted and
honestly dealt with.
Constitutional law, like other law, is rooted in the conservative tradition of the legal system as a whole and thus more willingly pays
court to the muse of history and the force of precedent than to the
muse of sociology and the demand for revision. It is therefore not
surprising that lawyers read constitutions as law, in the ordinary meaning of that word, and that judges apply constitutional provisions as
they do other law.
[A constitution] commences, like a statute, with an "enacting clause" in the

form of a preamble. It reads like law; its language is the spare legal
language of command and prohibition, indistinguishable at most points in
texture and tone from the language of ordinary statute law; it neither argues
3
nor exhorts, but lays down, as law lays down, what is to be.
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, New York University.
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The Constitution of the United States was not cast in legal mold by
accident, but by design that was itself the product of ineluctable history. A written Constitution seemed necessary not only to assure
adequate authority in the central government, but more importantly to
give permanent protection against the potential abuses of government
with which there was familiarity enough. The distrust of British forms
of government, whether in terms of absolute monarchy or of parliamentary supremacy, had provoked the Declaration of Independence
and its ringing denunciation of the "repeated injuries and usurpations"
of the "present King of Great Britain." 4 Even after military victory was
assured, continuing mistrust of centralized authority had dictated the
weak alliance of nation and states provided for in the Articles of
Confederation, which proved to be more a charter of "thou shalt nots"
than a formula for effective government.
Perhaps fortunately for the future course of American history, the
experience under the Articles was so nearly disastrous that the drafting
of an entirely new constitution was quickly seen to be the necessary
next development. Even so, it is remarkable that, in the short period
between the final ratification of the Articles in 1781 and the convening
of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, there could have been so
complete a reshaping of operative constitutional theory. From a confederation of extremely narrow national power, transition was astonishingly accomplished to a national government of potentially vast affirmative power; from an almost unamendable charter, transition was made
to a Constitution which provided flexibility for growth and change; and
where judicial review had been precluded before, it now seemed
assured. In only one particular were the original motivations of those
who sought rupture with Great Britain preserved in both documents.
The idea that all government, particularly the national government,
must be strictly limited in some respects was preserved intact and
indeed made still more explicit in the Bill of Rights
which soon became
in effect a part of the original Constitution.5
Experiment, however, the new Constitution was; and experiment it
remains even a century and three-quarters later. Though some of the
4. The Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress (October 14,
1774) and the Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms (July 6,
1775) inveighed principally against Parliament. However, by 1776, when the Declaration of Independence was issued, "it had become the accepted theory of the colonists
that Parliament had no power whatsoever over them and that they were bound to
the British empire only by their allegiance to the king. It was this tie with Britain
which the Declaration stated was severed." SOURCES OF OuR LmERanEs 317 (Perry &
Cooper eds. 1959). For the text of the three Declarations, see id. at 286-89, 295-300,
319-22.
5. See THE GREAT BiGiHTS (Cahn ed. 1963), particularly Black, The Bill of Rights
and the Federal Government, in id. at 41, and Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the
States, in id. at 65.
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rough edges of uncertainty may have been worn off, the Constitution
is, in the second half of the twentieth century, as it was in the late
eighteenth century, a charter in constant motion. "From age to age,
the problem of constitutional adjudication is the same. . . . It is to
6
keep one age unfettered by the fears or limited vision of another."
The Constitution of the United States was not only an experiment.
It was also an act of faith. Those who drafted the Constitution, and
those who voted for its ratification, affirmed their faith in a government whose powers were at most suggested without explicit definition.
That is the kind of constitution Mr. Justice Cardozo had in mind when
he described the constitutional ideal:
A constitution states or ought to state not rules for the passing hour, but
principles for an expanding future. In so far as it deviates from that standard, and descends into details and particulars it loses its flexibility, the scope

of interpretation contracts, the meaning hardens. 7

However sound that statement of the constitutional function may
now seem, in the eighteenth century the intentional creation of a government with ill-defined powers was an act of such extreme courage
that it might well have seemed mere foolhardiness. Indeed, the final
draft of the Constitution, the product of one great, and many small,
compromises, did not entirely satisfy anyone; and a number of those
who attended the Convention did not sign it. Alexander Hamilton,
the only delegate from New York who was willing to sign, agreed that
it was not "perfect in every part"; and when he later recommended its
ratification it was with the faint compliment that it was "upon the
whole, a good one, [and] is the best that the present views and circumstances of the country will permit."8 Others were even less enthusiastic, particularly in such important states as New York and
Virginia, where ratification was achieved by perilously narrow margins,
and only after assurances had been given that a bill of rights would be
immediately proposed as further protection against governmental
abuse.
Hesitation was understandable. Earlier experience with written
constitutions had not only been limited in extent, but as well largely
unpromising. John Locke, who was as much as anyone the intellectual
preceptor for the drafters of the Constitution of the United States, had
failed in his own efforts at constitution drafting. Confident of the perfection of the constitution which he had drafted for the government of
Carolina, he had resolutely provided against change. "These funda6. DouGLAs, WE = JuDGEs 429, 430 (1956).

7. CGAozo, THE NATuRE OF Tx JuwIcLL ProcEss 83-84 (1921).
8. Tim FEDERAIiST, No. 85, at 590 (Cooke ed. 1961) (Hamilton).
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mental constitutions," he had said, "shall be and remain the sacred
and unalterable form and rule of government of Carolina forever."'
Although we can now understand why that constitution was unacceptable, we can also understand the doubts that might have been
felt at the proposal in 1787 of a constitution with largely undefined
powers and the possibility of amendment over the objection of even
several states.
Experience before Locke seemed to point the same way. Solon,
whose very name came to signify legal wisdom, was so confident that
his proposed reforms were forever sound that he bound the Athenians
by oath to proclaim that his laws should not be altered for one hundred
years. 10 And Justinian had prohibited any commentary on the product
of his codifiers, an act which is now "remembered only for its futility."'"
Somehow the drafters were wise enough to reject these lessons of
more remote history and to be guided instead by their own experience
with the rigidly fixed provisions of the Articles of Confederation.
Appealingly aware of their own fallibility they provided a way of
amendment that was neither so easy as to encourage ill-considered
change nor so difficult as to preclude earnestly sought revision. 12
The crowning achievement of the Constitution-drafters-even more
important than the devising of a successful formula for amendment of
the fundamental charter-was their creation of a "living" Constitution,13 adaptable to developments in the physical and social sciences
that could not then have been anticipated, and responsive to the
changing mores of generations yet unborn. Many years later Woodrow
Wilson described the kind of government which that vision made
possible.
[G]overnment is not a machine, but a living thing .... It is accountable to
AND SUPREME LAW 6 (Cahn ed. 1954).
10. WoRMfsER, THE STORY oF TmE LAW 51 (rev. ed. 1962). See also the remarks
of Chief Justice Warren in a 1963 address at the Georgia Institute of Technology:
"And perhaps the greatest wisdom they showed was in leaving to the people the
right to change [the Constitution] by amendment when its language or its interpretation no longer served the national purpose. They knew that change is a law of life,
and they did not want our charter of government to be like the laws of the Medes
and the Persians which never changed and which eventually became a symbol of the
dead past." Warren, Science and the Law: Change and the Constitution, 12 J. Pun.
L. 1, 7 (1963).
11. CAsmozo, THE NATmRE OF THE JUDIcIAL PRocEss 18 (1921).
12. The lesson has lasted well. A proposed change in the amending process, sponsored by the Council of State Governments, and approved by several state legislatures
in early 1963, was disapproved by the American Bar Association later in the same
year, 49 A.B.A.J. 986-88 (1963), and seems destined for the limbo it so richly deserves.
For a penetrating analysis of the dangers of the proposal, see Black, The Proposed
Amendment of Article V: A Threatened Disaster, 72 YALE L.J. 957 (1963).
13. See Miller, Notes on the Concept of the "Living" Constitution, 31 CFO. WASH.
L. REv. 881 (1963).

9. SuPRnmm CoURT
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Darwin, not to Newton. It is modified by its environments, necessitated by
its tasks, shaped to its functions by the sheer pressure of life. .... 14

Although a nation and its social structure may be shaped in large
part by its constitution and laws, those legal formulations are them-

selves the product of the nation and social structure of which they are a
part. In this there is no contradiction. Law and society are inextricably
interrelated; each strives constantly to remake the other into its own
image. No one can say which takes the lead in this continuous process
of change or which is superior to the other, for in truth each is anterior
to its counterpart, while equally each succeeds the other. And so it is
that "the judges lead the community's sense of justice as they follow
it."15
History confirms the point. The greatness of the Roman Empire
was in no small part attributable to the appropriateness of the legal
structure that was created to meet the needs not only of Rome, but
as well, in a marvel of flexibility, the needs of the widely disparate
elements of which the Empire was composed. Justinian's Code, although in the evening of Roman greatness, was a superb distillation
and rationalization for Roman civilization. Its wide influence throughout the modem civil law world, and even to an extent in the common
law world, is adequate reminder of the staying power of a legal
structure rationally conceived.
The three most influential revolutions of modem times, the American, French, and Russian, were all grounded upon well articulated
philosophies of government, from which supporting institutions could
be erected and legal doctrines formulated to ensure fulfillment of the
principles for which the struggle had been commenced.
In the United States the strongly phrased Declaration of Independence was within a dozen years succeeded by the Continental Congress,
the Articles of Confederation, and the supremely enduring Constitution
of the United States. Because the general political and legal objectives
were agreed upon from the beginning, it was possible to flesh out the
whole structure of the government superbly well in a relatively short

time.
In France, however unclear may have been the dramatic cry for
"liberty, equality, and fraternity," and however disorganized the
period immediately following the physical success of the revolution,
the underlying philosophy soon emerged. The frame of government
established in the post-Napoleonic period, although not destined to
survive in that precise form, operated until the upheavals of 1848
14. WSON, CoNsTrrunoNArL GovERNmENT iN TnE UNrrED STATES 56-57 (1908).
15. Rosiow, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE 84 (1962).
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made further change necessary, once again to accommodate to the
demands of the governed for a government contemporary to their
needs. France also contributed, on the private law side, the magnificent accomplishment that was the Napoleonic Code of 1804, which has
survived all succeeding challenges to the soundness of its fundamental
organization.
Even in Russia, where the success of the revolution of 1917 might
have seemed the prelude to rejection of the very idea of a government
of laws, at least as other nations recognize that concept, inspiration was
from the beginning premised on the systematic expositions in law and
logic of Marx and Engels. The failure to achieve elsewhere the anticipated destruction of capitalist society and the persistent refusal of
the state to wither away even in Russia are sufficient reminders of the
way in which the law accommodates to the exigent facts of the social
order. The Soviet state quickly adjusted to these denials in practice of
the teachings of theory by creating new norms of government and law
that conformed to the realities with which the state, in its highly
unwithered form, was confronted.
The United States Constitution, the oldest surviving written constitution, well illustrates stability and change in constitutional law.
The very fact of its survival with minimal change over more than 175
years of striking social evolution is strongly persuasive, not only that it
was "intended to endure for ages to come,"' 6 but as well that it was
soundly conceived to achieve exactly that end. The grants of power
in the first three articles, to the Congress, the President, and the federal
judiciary, were couched in language that was not cautiously restrictive
-scarcely, one might say, even guarded.
Article I offers the Congress a generous choice of legislative powers.
The scant sixteen words of the commerce clause state a formula which
has proved ample for the development of the principal source of national power. The generously unconfined language of the power to tax
and spend for the general welfare offers a similarly open-ended invitation for the expansive interpretation which that clause has received
from both Congress and Court. When there is added to these and
other great legislative powers the culminating elasticity of the "necessary and proper clause," the flex of the legislative muscle is adequately
suggested.
The first sentence of article II provides that "the executive Power
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." When
there is added to this the uncertain but expandable reach of the President's power as commander-in-chief and as principal custodian of the
treaty power, it is understandable how strong chief executives have
16. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
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been able to wield vast authority. 17
Even the federal judiciary, with no power to initiate or adopt legislative programs, is the beneficiary under article III of substantial powers
of supervision and restraint upon the other branches of government.
Judicial review, as reinforced by the supremacy clause of article VI,
is undeniably a powerful instrument which can be used alternatively in
the interests of stability or as the advance guard of change.
The significance of stability and change in constitutional law can
perhaps best be understood through examination of several principles
which may be regarded as basic to the development of constitutional
law in the United States.
First. The shaping of constitutional law is not the exclusive province
of the Supreme Court of the United States, or even of the judiciary as
a whole. President and Congress alike have always been concerned
with the constitutional validity of proposed action, whether legislative
or executive in character. The rare occasions on which a Congress or
a President has advised action in disregard of apparent constitutional
barriers are celebrated for their exceptionality, not for their usualness. 18
Alexander Hamilton believed that "the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power," and thus "the
least dangerous to the political rights of the constitution .... ,,19
Others
have feared judicial usurpation in light of the presumed finality of
judicial review."0 It is more likely, however, that the veto power of the
Court is not as important as its creative function. Even in its more
negative role the Court is not beyond reversal, in a few instances by
constitutional amendment, and more significantly
by legislative re21
vision to avoid constitutional difficulties.
In considering the negative or restraining powers of the federal
judiciary it is instructive to recall how relatively few are the instances
in which the Supreme Court has invalidated any portion of a federal
17. See, e.g., the discussion in the various opinions in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
18. Probably the most celebrated instance of executive disregard of potential constitutional difficulties was the letter of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the chairman
of a congressional committee urging passage of legislation regulating the coal industry.
It concluded as follows: "I hope your committee will not permit doubts as to constitutionality, however reasonable, to block the suggested legislation." 4 PUBLIC PAPERS
AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKmIN D. RoosEvELT 297 (1938).
19. Tr FEI)ESAIT, No. 78, at 522, 523 (Cooke ed. 1961) (Hamilton).
20. See, e.g., BouDni, GoVER'r BY JuDcICxLY (1932); of. HAND, THE BILL OF
RIGrrrs (1958).
21. "Congress has undoubted power to redefine the distribution of power over interstate commerce. It may either permit the states to regulate the commerce in a manner
which would otherwise not be permissible . . . or exclude state regulation even of
matters of peculiarly local concern which nevertheless affect interstate commerce."
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945).
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statute,22 amounting altogether to fewer than a hundred;2 many of
those decisions either involved relatively unimportant statutes or were

themselves later overruled. 24 The times when a presidential act has

been specifically repudiated by the Court have been fewer still.25

Moreover, Congress and President alike have proved themselves uncommonly inventive in finding ways around these occasional barriers
erected by the judiciary. Indeed, the Court has never specifically
denied the power of the Congress to revise or even withdraw the

jurisdiction of federal courts, and specifically of the Supreme Court. 6
The interdependence of Court, Congress, and President and their
joint responsibility for the shaping of constitutional law were effectively
summarized in a report of the Senate Judiciary Committee during the
period when President Roosevelt's so-called "Court-packing" plan
was being debated:
Today it may be the Court which is charged with forgetting its constitutional duties. Tomorrow it may be the Congress. The next day it may be
the Executive. If we yield to the temptation now to lay the lash upon
the Court, we are only teaching others to apply it to ourselves .... 27

The importance of judicial review should not, however, be minimized. The very fact of its existence assures basic stability in constitutional law while at the same time providing opportunity for growth

and change. To find both stability and change in the same doctrine
may seem at first ambiguous. Explanation lies in the fact that both are

appropriate functions of the Supreme Court in its role as developer
22. The number of decisions invalidating state legislation is much greater, bringing
to mind the remark of Mr. Justice Holmes: "I do not think the United States would
come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think
the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of
the several states." HOLMES, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPFRS 295-96

(1920).

23. In 1958 Chief Justice Warren observed that "In some 81 instances since this
Court was established it has determined that congressional action exceeded the bounds
of the Constitution." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 104 (1958).
24. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled in West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918), overruled in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870), overruled in Knox v. Lee (Legal Tender Cases),
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
25. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
26. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). Recent commentators
have doubted the continuing force of the decision. See Hart, The Power of Congress
To Limit the Jurisdictionof Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HAnv. L. Rinv.
1362 (1953); Merry, Scope of the Supreme Court's Appellate Jurisdiction: Historical
Basis, 47 MINN. L. Rlv. 53 (1962); Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rxv. 157 (1960).
27. Sen. Judiciary Comm., Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary, S. REP. No. 711,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1937).
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and expositor of constitutional law. Through judicial review it is
possible to preserve a conservative link with the past while, not inconsistently, seeking current anchorage in the dynamics of the contemporary scene. Thus the Court has sometimes thought it necessary
to restrain economic innovation or social experimentation, while at
other times it has been willing to examine legislative programs and
executive action in more relaxed and permissive fashion.
Perhaps the outstanding example which illustrates both aspects of
the Court's attitude toward judicial review is found in the fluctuating
course of the doctrines pursuant to which specific prohibitions of the
Bill of Rights are made applicable to the states. Not long after the
ratification of the fourteenth amendment the Court concluded that
neither the privileges and immunities clause nor the due process clause
imposed upon the states limitations comparable to those upon the national government enumerated in the Bill of Rights.2 But in the
twentieth century the Court has found that many of those specifics
are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the
Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the states."29 By the
end of 1963 the only important guarantees of the Bill of Rights which
had not been specifically "incorporated" into the due process clause
were the privilege against self-incrimination, the double jeopardy
clause, and the right of jury trial in civil suits. Challenge continues as
to each of these, and no one can be sure where the matter will end in
this continuing dialogue concerning the meaning of liberty and the
extent to which government should be restricted. 0
Second. Justices of the Supreme Court do legislate, as do their
counterparts in the lower federal courts and in the state courts. Mr.
justice Jackson once observed wryly that "Every justice has been
accused of legislating and everyone has joined in that accusation of
others."31 The question is not whether, but when, in what degree, and
for what ends. It is easy for those who disagree with particular decisions to cry "judicial legislation" much as they might cry "foul" at
a sporting event in protest against an unpopular decision by a referee.
Thus understood, "judicial legislation" is not inherently more dangerous
to the sound progression of constitutional law than "judicial self28. The cases are reviewed in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
29. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). For recent additions see Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
30. The incorporation into due process of the privilege against self-incrimination is
raised in Malloy v. Hogan, 150 Conn. 220, 187 A.2d 744, cert. granted, 373 U.S.
948 (1963). It has even been suggested that the jury-trial provision of the seventh
amendment as to civil cases might be incorporated. N.Y.U. Law Center Bull., pp. 6-7,
Fall, 1963.
31. JACKSON, THE S PREM CouRT IN THE AismcAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 80
(1955).
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restraint," however more usual may be a demand for the latter.
The much more important inquiry involves an examination of what
courts do with their decision-making power, remembering that failure
to keep the law abreast of the times may be as serious an abuse of
discretion as a too rapid acceleration in the pursuit of an unripe objective. No one seriously argues, in the vein of Dooley's famous complaint, that judges should follow the election returns.-2 The judge
confronted with a problem of constitutional interpretation is required
to make a more discriminating assessment. Professor Paul Freund has
stated it well: "The judge need only be careful not to confuse the
climate of opinion with the heat of the day, not to mistake the gusts of
a local storm with the steady winds of doctrine."33 Even though
judges may legislate "only interstitially . . . confined from molar to
4
molecular motions," as Mr. Justice Holmes stated it,M
their task remains vital and fraught with hazard. There is not in constitutional
interpretation the easy road to certainty which Sir Henry Maine
attributed to English courts in the nineteenth century:

When a group of facts comes before an English Court for adjudication ....
it is taken absolutely for granted that there is somewhere a rule of known

law which will cover the facts of the dispute now litigated, and that, if such
a rule be not discovered, it is only that the necessary patience, knowledge or
acumen, is not forthcoming to detect it.35

There is no escaping the fact that law, particularly constitutional law,
is not simply "discovered." The formulation and development of controlling principles are in important part shaped by conscious judicial
participation in the growth process.
Third. In constitutional law, as elsewhere in the legal system, appropriate reliance on the doctrine of stare decisis assures continuity
and stability for the preservation of the system. But, as Mr. Justice
Harlan observed in 1962, the Supreme Court has a "considered practice
not to apply stare decisis as rigidly in constitutional as in nonconstitutional cases ..... 6 And Mr. Justice Douglas noted in the same case
that "matters of constitutional interpretation . . .are always open."37

The reasons are not hard to comprehend.
Every rule of law is an experiment, whether resulting from case-by32. See Mn.DOOLEY

ON THE CHOICE OF LAw 52 (Bander ed. 1963).
33. FnEuuND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 18 (1949).
34. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (dissenting opinion).
35. MAINE, ANCIENT LAw 30 (2d American from 2d London ed. 1874).
36. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962). See also United States v.
South Buffalo Ry., 333 U.S. 771, 774-75 (1948); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106,
119 (1940); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-08 (1932) (dissenting opinion).
37. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, supra note 36, at 592 (dissenting opinion).
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case development into a principle of the common law, from judicial
interpretation of statute, or from judicial application of such generalized commands and prohibitions as the executive power, the commerce
power, or due process of law. If the hypothesis upon which a particular
solution is premised is proved false, or if the operative facts shift so
that the hypothesis is no longer relevant, precedent should not forbid
needed change. Rules of law, constitutional no less than others, are
generalizations designed to permit men to live in close proximity with
their fellows in an orderly society. But these generalizations, however
precisely right for one generation, are "not fixed rules for deciding
doubtful cases, but instrumentalities for their investigation, methods
by which the net value of past experience is rendered available for
present scrutiny of new perplexities."The full Latin maxim, of which stare decisis is the shortened form,
is itself instructive as to the creative, but not inflexibly binding, nature
of precedent. Stare decisis et non quieta movere, said to be the full
expression, translates thus: "To adhere to precedents, and not to
unsettle things which are established." 39 There is exactly the point.
The law, if it is to serve its proper role in society, can never be fully
at rest, but must always be to some extent in motion, ever searching
for its own best ends.
The search for a static security-in the law as elsewhere-is misguided.
The fact is that security can only be achieved through constant change,
through the wise discarding of old ideas that have outlived
their usefulness,
40
and through the adopting of others to current facts.

Reaffirmation of the truism that precedent must sometimes give
way to new doctrine carries with it the danger of a different kind of
misunderstanding. While some believe that the Supreme Court has
not been mindful of the force and utility of precedent, quite the
reverse is in fact true. As recently as 1958 the record of Supreme
Court overruling decisions stood at only ninety,41 and there have been
very few additional instances since that time.42 This is not a significantly large number when it is recalled that most of the doctrines
overruled were neither very important by the time of discard nor
even of great moment in their revised forms, however proper it may
have been in each case to prune out the legal deadwood. The few
38. D wEY, HumAN NATuRE ANm CoNDucT 240, 241 (1922).
39. B.ce's LAw DICTIONARY 1578 (1951).
40. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 CoLJm. L. REv. 735 (1949).
41. Blaustein & Field, "Overruling" Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 MICH. L.
Rv. 151 (1958).
42. The most prominent recent example is Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963), overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942). Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962), limiting, if not overruling, Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
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dramatic and well remembered overrulings are the exceptions. And
who is there now to argue that the Court's second thoughts were
not ordinarily better in these celebrated cases than the discarded
doctrine? Surely we are more comfortable today with a Constitution
which forbids manifestations of racial discrimination in state-run
primary elections43 and in public schools" than a Constitution which
invites discrimination or is silent on that score. There are no longer
many who would deny a large measure of freedom to state and
federal legislatures in their efforts to deal with matters of economic
and social welfare. 45 There is no longer much wistful looking back
at rulings which permitted compulsory flag salutes" or the trial of
civilian dependents outside the United States by military courtsmartial.47 Nor on the procedural side is there any noticeable demand
for reconsideration of the doctrine that in diversity cases federal
courts should apply the substantive law of the states in which they
48

sit.

The great precepts of constitutional law, while not matters of whim
or caprice, must nonetheless be capable of movement and flexibility.
There is no better example of the growth possible in constitutional
principles than the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
of which Mr. Justice Frankfurter has said, speaking of only one of its
aspects, "due process is not confined within a permanent catalogue
of what may at a given time be deemed the limits or the essentials
of fundamental rights."49 Precedent is thus a means to the end of
constitutional growth and adaptation; it most assuredly is not an end
in itself.
Fourth. History and experience have been, and are, the great instruments for the definition of constitutional law. Oliver Wendell
Holmes could have been thinking of constitutional law as well as of
the common law when he wrote that "The life of the law has not been
43. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1044), overruling Grovey v. Townsend,
295 U.S. 45 (1935).
44. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), almost overruling Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The overruling was completed in Gayle v. Browder,
352 U.S. 903 (1956).
45. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937),
overruling Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), and Morehead v.
Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936). Cf. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-31 (1963).
46. See Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), overruling Minersville
School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
47. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), overruling, on rehearing, Reid v. Covert,
351 U.S. 487 (1956), and Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956).
48. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
49. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
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logic: it has been experience." 5 No thinking judge denies what
Maitland asserted: "To-day we study the day before yesterday, in
order that yesterday may not paralyse to-day, and to-day may not
paralyse to-morrow."5 '
History and experience interact upon one another so that today's
experience with Supreme Court rulings becomes tomorrow's history,
ready at hand for adaptation into restatement, modification, or rejection of earlier rulings when next presented for judicial consideration. History is a dynamic component of the judicial process which
encourages constant re-examination of doctrines and positions. So long
as history is not viewed as a static element, the Constitution can be
preserved ever young. History serves the useful function of calling
attention to the value of stability, but is clearly no enemy of change.
Rather it is the vehicle through which orderly change may be
achieved.
Fifth. Probably it has always been true, and certainly it is clear
in the twentieth century, that effective government is flexible government. Adaptability must be the catchword, not only to meet crises
of the moment but as well to accommodate to changed ways of looking
at constitutional doctrines, particularly at limitations on government,
such as "unreasonable" search and seizure, due process, equal protection of the laws, and the other vital but open-ended value judgments built into the Constitution. A central function of the three
great branches of government, legislative, executive, and judicial alike,
is the constant re-examination and redefinition of these values in the
contemporary context.
In this process of continuous review and revision critics have found
elements of uncertainty that seem to them signs of instability; and of
course change by itself does not necessarily mean growth. But the
error of the critics lies in viewing all change with suspicion and failing to see the real value that inheres in indefiniteness of formula.
With wise guidance from all branches of government, and with honest
cooperation among them, vagueness of prescription and proscription
alike are seen to be virtues. Chief Justice Hughes once put it this
way: "When, in other branches of higher learnings, theology, philosophy, science, the experts disagree, why should we expect
suddenly
52
in the law to rise to the icy stratosphere of certainty?"
We should be grateful that "the provisions of the Constitution are
not mathematical formulas." 53 As a result there is a rare opportunity
HoLmEs, THE COMMON LAw 1 (1881).
51. 3 MArTLANo, COLLECTED PAPEaS 439 (1911).
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52. Quoted by Professor Freund in OYEz, OYEz, OYEz 35 (1963), the printed version
of "Storm Over the Supreme Court," a CBS News Broadcast of Feb. 20, 1963.
53. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914) (Holmes, J.).
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for the development of constitutional law to proceed by way of a
continuing dialogue between the Court and the Congress, the Court
and the President, and, significantly, between the Court and the
people. The Court's prestige is in part attributable to the fact that
it is willing to learn from informed criticism, whatever the source.
Bearing this in mind it is apparent why federal constitutional law
in the United States has always been essentially contemporary in its
responses. Although rooted in the past, constitutional doctrine is not
immutably fixed. Instead, constitutional law ever looks at the present
as the harbinger of the future. Examples come readily to mind.
1. Use of the so-called "Brandeis brief' has sometimes been permitted by the Court,s4 in seeming violation of the requirement that
all pertinent factual matter must appear in the trial court record; but
in the early years of the century when the idea was new, a brief which
drew on reports of public investigating committees, writings of relevant authorities, and comparable legislative practices was useful in
support of the validity of state economic and social welfare legislation. At that time such laws were not necessarily accorded the benefit
of the presumption of constitutionality as would now be the case.55
The whole point of the Brandeis brief was to ensure that the Court
had access to contemporary factual data and informed opinions as to
the implications of the decisions it was called upon to make.
2. No case better illustrates the fact that the Constitution is to be
read in the present tense than Brown v. Board of Education where
the Court said explicitly:
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when
the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was
written. We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only

in this way can it be determined if segregation in public
schools deprives
56
these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.

The promise of the early demise of racial discrimination as a result

of this and related decisions was, as is well known, not promptly
achieved under the mandate to achieve desegregation in public

schools "with all deliberate speed." But the Court's impatience with
unjustified delay has been made clear. Mr. Justice Goldberg has recently spoken pointedly for the Court:
The rights here asserted are, like all such rights, present rights; they are
54. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); FREUND, ON UNDEmSTANDiNc Tntnu
SuLTNniE CouRT 86-92 (1949).
55. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
56. 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954). For an earlier but not dissimilar reaction, see
Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924).
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not merely hopes to some future enjoyment of some formalistic constitutional
promise. The basic guarantees of our Constitution are warrants for the here

and now and, unless there
is an overwhelmingly compelling reason, they
57
are to be promptly fulfilled.

3. The capacity for growth of the American Constitution is by no
means exclusively a product of the recent past. In the nineteenth
century, when the concern was less with individual freedom, and
more with freedom of property, constitutional growth and change
were equally demonstrable. One striking example from that period
is found in the gradual shift from reliance on the obligation of contracts clause to emphasis on the due process clause as a restraint on
state legislative authority in economic matters.
Article I, section 10, of the Constitution denies to the states the
power to enact any "law impairing the obligation of contracts." Beginning with Chief Justice Marshall the word "contracts" was given
a surprisingly broad reading to prevent the repeal or modification of
legislative grants, to prevent the withdrawal of tax exemptions, to
prevent the impairment of a charter granted by a state, and to limit
relief available to debtors under state insolvency laws.5 The federal
judiciary thus early became a guardian of the rights of private
property against state interference. As a result, during the first
century of experience under the Constitution the contract clause was
considered in almost forty per cent of all cases involving the validity
of state legislation.59 However, with the rise of the railroad, and as
the courts enlarged the concept of the police power of the states,
the contracts clause received an increasingly restrictive interpretation. Although in 1819 the Court had readily found an implied grant
in perpetuity of the charter to Dartmouth College, by 1837 a
majority could not find an implied grant of monopoly to the Charles
River Bridge Company.6 ° Thus began he doctrine that nothing passes
by implication in a public grant, unquestionably a limitation on the
earlier cases. From this the Court moved gradually, but with seeming
inevitability, to an essentially devitalized contracts cause.6 1
Denial of the laissez-faire philosophy under the contracts clause by
57. Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 533 (1963).
58. See, e.g., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.). 5I& (1819);
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819); New Jersey v, Wilson, 11
U.S. (7 Cr.) 164 (1812); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cr.) 87 (1810).
59. WIcirr, THs 'CoNTnAcr CLAUSE OF THE CONsTIruTIoN 95 (1938).

60. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
61. See Wabash R.R. v. Defiance, 167 U.S. 88, 97 (1897)i Butcher's' Union Co. v.
Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814,. 820
(1880). For the similar result as to priv ate contracts, see. Manigault v. Springs, 199
U.S. 473, 480 (1905). See also the discussion in Swlsm, AmucA_ CONsTrruTnONAL
DEVELOPMENT 149-67 (2d ed. 1954).
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no means meant in the nineteenth century an abdication of property
interests to the tender mercies of the state legislatures. Reminder
is scarcely necessary of the way in which the due process clause,
and to a lesser extent the equal protection of the laws clause, of the
fourteenth amendment continued the good offices that had previously
been satisfied by the obligation of contracts concepts. The contracts
clause, at best a somewhat special prohibition, had always been a
limited vehicle for the vast tasks originally assigned to it; but the
due process clause, available after 1868, suffered from no such modest
limitation. The focus then shifted from the narrow obligation of
contracts concept to the much broader area of liberty of contract
whose high point was marked in Lochner v. New York.6 2 Despite
the forceful attack upon the doctrine advanced by Mr. Justice Holmes'
complaint that "The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics,"63 this remained the prevailingalthough sometimes wavering-doctrine of the Court until 1934.6
Whether the latest shift marks the Court's return "to the original
constitutional proposition," as Mr. Justice Black has suggested, 6 is
not here the point. It is simply to note judicial responsiveness to the
winds of change that unquestionably blew in the direction of permissiveness for state economic and social experimentation.
The above reminder of the development of constitutional doctrine
was drawn from a past era in constitutional law, when concern for
property rights was supreme. Now, however, the changed temper of
the times demands that the Court sit primarily as guardian of individual liberties, leaving to the Congress and state legislatures almost
exclusive control over the allocation of property rights. Professor
Freund summarized the situation in these words: "when freedom of
the mind is imperiled by law, it is freedom that commands a momentum of respect; when property is imperiled, it is the lawmakers' judgment that commands respect."6
CONCLUSION

Interpretation of the Constitution is no less difficult than must have
been the original task of draftsmanship. The fact that the Constitution is a written document has assured the advantages of stability in
constitutional law, particularly in the guarantee thus assured of restrictions against governmental abuse. At the same time the capacity
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
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for change in the nature of restrictions and powers alike has been
demonstrated over and over again by the Supreme Court, often in
concert with the Congress and the President.
The genius of the American Constitution arises out of the effective
balance achieved, however precariously and almost accidentally, between the need for stability and the essential accommodation to
change. Again, it was Cardozo who hit the right note.
The final cause of law is the welfare of society. The rule that misses its
aim cannot permanently justify its existence. . . . Logic and history and
custom have their place. We will shape the law to conform to them when
we may; but only67 within bounds. The ends which the law serves will
dominate them all.
67. CARuozo, THE
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